The Python Software Foundation and the Python developer community take security vulnerabilities very seriously. A Python Security Response Team has been formed that does triage on all reported vulnerabilities and recommends appropriate countermeasures. To reach the response team, send email to security at python dot org. Only the response team members will see your email, and it will be treated confidentially.
The PSRT mailing list is tightly controlled, so you can have confidence that your security issue will only be read by a highly trusted cabal of Python developers. If you further wish to encrypt your message to this mailing list, you can use our shared OpenPGP key which is also available on the public keyservers. Key fingerprint:
pub 2048R/D067453C 2010-09-08 Key fingerprint = F314 452F E3F9 BF87 0435 7732 D273 E0FF D067 453C uid Python Security Response Team <email@example.com> sub 2048R/0953421B 2010-09-08
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Depending on the risk of the issue, sometimes firstname.lastname@example.org might not be the best channel to report it.
The risk level is often determined by a product of the impact once exploited, and the probability of exploitation occurring. In other words, if a bug can cause great damage, but it takes highest privilege to exploit the bug, then the bug is not a high risk one. Similarly, if the bug is easily exploitable, but its impact is limited, then it is not a high risk issue either.
There is not any hard and fast rule to determine if a bug is worth reporting. The general rule is any attack worth reporting via the security address must allow an attacker to affect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the Python application or its system for which the attacker does not already have the capability.
To illustrate the point, here are some examples of past issues and what the Python Security Response Team (PSRT) thinks of them. When in doubt, however, please do send us a report nonetheless. If the responder can't find any relevant exploitable code, the report may be re-posted publicly.
In issue #27863, several problems such as
use-after-free, and out-of-bound memory access in module
reported. However, the exploit cannot be provoked by providing it with XML
data. It requires that the attacker be able to provoke the execution of the
__getstate__ method, which is something an attacker would only be able to do
if they had the ability to execute arbitrary Python code, or, if they could
somehow coerce the application to pickle an XML tree. Neither of these are
generally possible from an unprivileged position.
Issue #272829 is a double-free bug in a
highly critical builtin module
ssl. However, the bug requires an attacker
who can cause PyWeakref_NewRef to fail, which means the ability to
deterministically exhaust memory at a specific point in C code execution.
While these are clearly important bugs to fix, and may, in some hypothetical situations, have a security impact, the only proof of concept the PSRT can imagine for any of them is to be able to execute arbitrary Python code. If you can already execute Python code, there are far worse things you can do than provoke a use-after-free or an interpreter crash.
Issue #7673 is a security vulnerability that affect an obscure corner of the standard library but it is appropriate to disclose privately, because the APIs that it affects are ones designed to handle untrusted data, something that an attacker could plausibly get a Python program to consume with the expectation that it would be safe.
Issue #17239 and
#24238 are similar security
vulnerabilities affecting multiple popular builtin modules such as
elementtree. They allow an attacker to render a Python application
unavailable by feeding it malicious XML data.
The common theme of these vulnerabilities is they let the attacker escalate
privilege from unprivileged position. Arbitrary python code execution is the
highest level of privilege possible in the python interpreter. There are other
modules (such as
marshal) which explicitly say that all data must be taken
from only trusted sources (and hence privileged).
The Python Software Foundation is the organization behind Python. Become a member of the PSF and help advance the software and our mission.